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Abstract 
 This study examined the effects of mood and cognitive processing on risky 
choice framing. A mixed between- and within-subject lab experimental design 
was conducted to investigate our hypotheses. As predicted, the results indicate 
that cognitive processing moderated the effects of scenario framing, with higher 
levels of intuitive processing leading to classical framing effects, whereas higher 
levels of analytical processing leading to no such framing effects. Self-reported 
valence, as in self-rated positive or negative mood, was found to significantly 
account for variation in cognitive processing. Cognitive processing was, however, 
not found to mediate the relationship between induced mood and framing effects.  
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Introduction 
One of the most successful behavioural models for decision-making under 
risk is Tversky and Kahneman’s prospect theory (Trepel, Fox, & Poldrack, 2005). 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) argue that our choices are influenced by how 
prospects are cognitively represented, which is also referred to as framing effects. 
In other words, slightly changing how the same information is presented may 
influence whether decision-makers are risk seeking, or risk averse. Although 
recent reviews of framing conclude that framing effects seems to be a robust 
finding, framing effects are not always obtained. What becomes a key question is 
under what conditions framing effects are most likely to occur (McElroy & Seta, 
2003).  
There is a growing amount of evidence that mood influence judgment and 
decision-making (Blanchette & Richards, 2010). The role of mood and affective 
states in decision making under risk are also receiving increased attention (e.g., 
Peters, 2006; Kobbeltved, 2005). More recently, researchers have become 
interested in the role of anticipatory moods; as experienced during the decision-
making process, in contrast to previous studies examining anticipated moods; 
those expected to result from the consequences of a decision (Wang, 2006; 
Loewenstein, Hsee, Weber, & Wlech, 2001).  
A considerable amount of studies have examined the effects of positively 
and negatively valenced mood on judgment and decision-making (Chou, Lee, & 
Ho, 2007; Blanchette & Richards, 2010). Several of these findings suggest that 
negative and positive mood have a distinct impact on cognitive processing. 
Decision makers in positive mood are often found to increase reliance on intuitive, 
experiential processing, whereas decision makers in negative mood are found to 
engage in analytical, systematic processing (e.g., Cohen & Andrade, 2004; 
Blanchette & Richards, 2010; Tiedens & Linton, 2001). It is generally suggested 
that mood and cognitive evaluations work in concert to guide reasoning and 
decision-making (Loewenstein et al., 2001). 
There are some findings indicating that analytical processing may 
moderate framing effects, suggesting that participants engaging in analytical 
processing does not show framing effects (e.g., McElroy & Seta, 2003; Simon, 
Fagley & Halleran, 2004) As mood and cognitive processing are suggested to 
work in concert, and since relatively little research examines how moods or 
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cognitive processing impact the effects of risky choice framing, we derive at our 
research question: 
How does mood and cognitive processing influence framing effects? 
 
Literature Review and Hypotheses 
Central topics for our literature review are risky choice framing, prospect 
theory, mood, and cognitive processing.   
Risky Choice Framing 
Prospect Theory and Framing Effects 
According to the expected utility theory, the way information is framed 
should not influence the choices made by the decision maker (Plous, 1993; 
McElroy & Seta, 2003). On the contrary, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) 
demonstrated that how a decision problem was framed influenced individuals’ 
tendencies to either be risk aversive, or risk seeking. Trepel et al. (2005) defines 
individuals who are risk aversive as someone who “…prefers a sure payment to a 
risky prospect of equal or higher expected value” (p. 35). Risk seeking, on the 
contrary, is defined as someone who “… prefers a risky prospect to a sure 
payment of equal or higher expected value” (Trepel et al., 2005, p. 35). In order to 
demonstrate decision frames, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) developed the Asian 
disease problem. They define a decision frame as referring to “…the decision-
maker’s conception of the acts, outcomes, and contingencies associated with a 
particular choice” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, p. 453).  In the Asian disease 
problem, participants are asked to imagine the outbreak of an unusual Asian 
disease in the US, which is expected to kill 600 people. Next, they are presented 
with two programs to combat the disease and asked to choose the program they 
favor (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Half of the participants are presented with 
the gain-framed programs, A and B, whereas the other half of the participants is 
presented with the loss-framed programs, C and D. A gain frame refers to a 
situation where individuals perceive possible gain. On the contrary, a loss frame 
refers to a situation where individuals perceive the possibility of loss. The four 
programs in the Asian disease scenario will be presented to the participants in this 
study, and are presented as: 
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A: If program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. 
B: If program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved, 
and 2/3 probability that no people will be saved. 
 
C: If program C is adopted 400 people will die. 
D: If program D is adopted there is 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and 2/3 
probability that 600 people will die (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, p. 453). 
 
Although the expected outcomes of problem A and B, and C and D are 
mathematically the same, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) demonstrated that 
individuals tended to be risk-aversive in the gain frame, and risk seeking in the 
loss frame. In fact, 72 % of the participants choose the safe program A over the 
more risky program B in the gain frame. When the alternatives were framed as 
losses, however, 78 % preferred the risk seeking option, program D (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981). This preference reversal is referred to as classical framing 
effects (Xie & Wang, 2003; Kühberger & Tanner, 2010). According to Tversky 
and Kahneman (1981), such framing effects occur since people commonly adopt a 
more intuitive way of processing information since this simplifies evaluation and 
reduces cognitive strain.  
Prospect theory was developed as a critique of the expected utility theory, 
investigating and emphasizing how individuals actually behaved under decision-
making involving risk (Tversky & Kahneman, 1979). In other words, their 
findings invalidated the expected utility theory as a descriptive model. Prospect 
theory uses the term value instead of utility, implying that in decisions involving 
risk, individuals consider the gains and losses of each alternative. Put differently, 
this value function is defined on deviation from a reference point. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 
(Adopted from Tversky & Kahneman, 1979, p. 454) 
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As seen from figure 1.1, prospect theory predicts a value function that is 
generally concave for gains and convex for losses, implying that individuals tend 
to be risk aversive in a gain frame and risk seeking in a loss frame (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981; McElroy & Seta, 2003; Xie & Wang, 2003). This could further 
be exemplified through the notion that the “…displeasure associated with losing a 
sum of money is generally greater than the pleasure associated with winning the 
same amount” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, p. 454).  
The Likelihood of Framing Effects  
Several studies support framing effects as a reliable phenomenon (e.g. 
Wang, 1996; Kühberger, 1998). However, more recent reviews have concluded 
that although there is a moderately strong framing effect for manipulations that 
follow the Asian disease paradigm, framing effects are not always obtained 
(McElroy & Seta, 2003). For instance, Haerem, Bakken, Kuvaas and Karlsen 
(2010) conducted four experiments to explore the robustness of risky choice 
framing among military decision makers. The classical Asian disease scenario was 
used in the first experiment, whereas a military scenario was developed and used 
in the three other experiments in order to make the scenario more relevant to 
military officers. The structure and choice alternatives were identical to the 
classical Asian disease scenario (Haerem et al., 2010).  In contrast to Tversky and 
Kahneman (1981), who found a bidirectional framing effect, risk aversive in gain 
frame and risk seeking in loss frame, Haerem et al. (2010) found a unidirectional 
framing effect, implying that the participants were risk seeking in both domains. 
One plausible reason for these findings could be the cultural and contextual 
factors that influence military decision makers (Haerem et al., 2010). Wang and 
Johnston (1995) also found support for this unidirectional framing effect. They 
found that participants were more risk seeking, in both domains, when a decision 
problem was described in a more personal relevant family context (Wang & 
Johnston, 1995).  
A key question that arises from recent findings in the research field of 
judgment and decision-making is under what conditions framing effects are more, 
or less likely to occur. Mood are now receiving increased attention within the field 
of judgment and decision-making (Blanchette & Richards, 2010), and recent 
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studies have been conducted to investigate how mood and emotions influence 
decisions under risk (Peters, 2006; Kobbeltved, 2005). Despite this growing 
interest little research has, to our knowledge, been conducted to investigate the 
impact of mood on framing effects, especially in concert with the role of cognitive 
processing. 
Intuitive and Analytical Cognitive Processing 
As opposed to expected utility theory there is a growing amount of 
evidence indicating that humans do not always process information in a 
deliberative and rational way, but rather that human’s process information and 
make decisions in many different ways.  
Several researchers have described two different modes of cognitive 
processing, referred to as dual processing, where one is systematic and analytical, 
and the other is intuitive and experiential (e.g., Epstein, 1994; Kahneman, 2002; 
Mukherjee, 2010; Sloman, 1996; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004; 
Stanovich & West, 2000). According to Sanfey, Loewenstein, McClure, & Cohen 
(2006) “there is a long legacy of research within psychology, strongly supported 
by findings from neuroscience, to suggest human behavior is not the product of a 
single process, but rather reflects the interaction of different specialized 
subsystems” (p. 111). While the analytic system is slow, serial, controlled, effort-
full, rule governed, flexible, and neutral, the intuitive system is fast, parallel, 
automatic, effortless, associative, slow learning, and emotional (Kahneman, 
2002). There is no doubt about the evolutionary value of the experiential system 
as it allows us to make snap and efficient judgments and decisions of our 
environment. As intuitive processing is fast and automatic, whereas the systematic 
system is slow and effort full, it is suggested that decision makers engaging in 
intuitive processing will use considerably less time on a decision problem than 
individuals engaging in analytical processing.  
Sub-Scales of Cognitive Processing 
Betsch and Glöckner (2010) question “… whether heuristics really 
cover the potentials of intuitive thought” (p. 279). They stress that much of the 
literature within judgment and decision making (JDM) merely describe heuristics 
as simplifications of analytic thought, claiming that heuristics, as described in 
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JDM literature, cope with cognitive limitations by excluding effortful information 
processes (Betsch & Glöckner, 2010). Thus, they emphasize that “… intuition is 
capable of dealing with complex tasks through extensive information processing 
without noticeable effort” (Betsch & Glöckner, 2010, p. 280). 
Some researchers have further suggested that experiential processing may 
consist of several distinct aspects of intuition (e.g. Pretz & Totz, 2007). Glöckner 
and Witteman (2010) stress the fact that dual-process models assume a clear 
distinction between intuitive and analytic cognitive processes, but do not provide 
further differentiation within both categories. They propose that empirical testing 
should differentiate between cognitive processes subsumed in the category of 
intuition, to gain a better understanding of the processes and allow for more 
specific predictions. A distinction is made between heuristic and holistic aspects 
of intuition. Heuristic intuition refers to trust in snap judgments, and first 
impressions, whereas holistic intuition refers to a preference for abstract, holistic 
integration of complex information, and reliance on incubation in decision making 
(Pretz & Totz, 2007). Defining the concept of intuition, and operationalizing it 
efficiently remains a challenge, and we need to know more about the role of mood 
in the intuitive process (Langan-Fox & Shirley, 2011).  
Cognitive Processing and Framing Effects 
Shiomura & Atsumi (2001) investigated whether participants solving 
analytic and intuitive processing tasks differed in their response to framing. They 
found that participants in the intuitive processing condition showed classical 
framing effects; a preference for risk-seeking in loss frame, and a preference for 
risk-aversion in gain frame. In the analytic processing condition, however, the 
results suggested no framing effect. These findings suggest that when people 
engage in analytic processing they are less prone to framing effects compared to 
individuals engaging in intuitive processing. In the same vein, Simon, Fagley, and 
Halleran (2004) induced analytical processing by asking participants to write out 
the options as they would describe it to a friend, suggesting that analytical 
processing would moderate the effects of framing. Based on two studies including 
257 participants they conclude that framing effects are not observed when 
participants engage in analytical processing (Simon, Fagley, & Halleran, 2004).  
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McElroy & Seta (2003) conducted two experiments testing both induced 
and predisposed analytic versus intuitive processing on framing effects. 
Processing style was manipulated by making the designed task more or less 
relevant, as suggested by Liberman and Chaiken (1996); that highly relevant tasks 
induce more analytical processing. Consistent with their predictions and other 
findings, participants in the intuitive processing condition showed classical 
framing effects, whereas participants engaging in analytical processing were 
relatively insensitive to framing effects (McElroy & Seta, 2003).  
Based on empirical findings and theory on cognitive processing, we 
hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 1: cognitive processing will moderate the effects of risky choice 
framing. Specifically: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Higher levels of intuitive processing will increase the 
likelihood of classical framing effects; decision makers with high levels of 
intuitive processing will be risk aversive in gain frame, and risk seeking in 
loss frame. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: Higher levels of analytical processing will reduce the 
likelihood of classical framing effects; decision makers with high levels of 
analytical processing will be relatively insensitive to framing.  
 
Some research has also shown that framing may have an impact on 
processing style (Dunegan, 1991; Dunegan, 1993). Dunegan (1991) found that 
decisions following a positive frame (gain) appeared to be automatic and intuitive, 
whereas decisions following a negative frame (loss) were more deliberate and 
analytic. These findings are explained through image theory which states that a 
decision maker attempts to be cognitive economical when selecting a course of 
action (Dunegan, 1991). When in a positive frame, individuals experience 
compatibility between the decision problem and the desired future events, thus 
resulting in a more automatic and intuitive processing which are more cognitively 
economical. However, when individuals are presented with a negative frame, their 
experience of compatibility between the decision problem and desired future 
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events becomes threatened, prompting a more deliberate, systematic and more 
cognitive demanding processing style (Dunegan, 1991). In an additional study 
conducted by Dunegan (1993), similar findings were obtained.  
As seen from the literature review on the relationship between framing and 
cognitive processing, scholars have reached some conflicting conclusions for why 
framing effects occur. To investigate whether risky choice framing does not 
necessarily trigger intuitive processing, but rather distinct cognitive processing 
depending on loss or gain frame, we derive at our next and contradicting 
hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Decision makers in gain frame will engage in higher levels of 
intuitive processing, whereas decision makers in loss frame will engage in 
higher levels of analytical processing. 
 
As framing are suggested to impact the decision makers’ cognitive processing, 
we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The relationship between scenario framing and response is 
mediated by cognitive processing. 
Mood and Risk 
Scholars within the field of decision making usually view risk as “… 
increasing with the variance in the probability distribution of possible outcomes” 
(Trepel et al., 2005, p. 35). Much of the previous research on choices under risk 
has focused on cognitive aspects with little emphasis on how mood might 
influence risk assessments (Loewenstein et al., 2001; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; 
Wang, 2006). More recently, the influence of mood on risk has been studied more 
extensively (Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Kobbeltved et al., 2005; Peters et al., 2006; 
Wang, 2006; Blanchette & Richards, 2010), with the valence approach as the most 
dominant theory (Lerner & Keltner, 2000). 
Defining Mood 
There is some disagreement about how to define terms such as affect, 
emotions, and mood (Forgas, 1995; Luomala & Laaksonen, 2000). However, 
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Forgas (1995) defines affect as a more general label that refers to both moods and 
emotion. Emotions might be defined as “…intense, short-lived and usually have a 
definite cause and clear cognitive content (e.g. anger or fear)” (Forgas, 1992 as 
cited in Forgas, 1995, p. 41). The main focus of this paper, however, is mood, 
which could be defined as “… low-intensity, diffuse and relatively enduring 
affective states without a salient antecedent cause and therefore little cognitive 
content (e.g. feeling good or feeling bad)” (Forgas, 1992 as cited in Forgas, 1995, 
p. 41). Other scholars define mood as an affective state that is pervasive, 
subjectively perceived by the individual, and are distinguished from the intense 
and short-lived character of emotions (Gardner, 1985).  In the same vein, Kumar 
(1997) explain mood as an affective state that is usually more enduring than 
emotions. Luomala and Laaksonen (2000), states that the several definitions of 
mood emphasize the structural aspects of mood. In other words, they attempt to 
answer the question “what are moods?” (Luomala & Laaksonen, 2000). Contrary 
to the structurally oriented view on mood, the functionally oriented view on mood 
put a greater emphasis on the functional aspects of mood, trying to answer the 
question “why do moods exist?” (Luomala & Laaksonen, 2000). An example of a 
functional definition of mood is seen in (Morris, 1992 as cited in Luomala & 
Laaksonen, 2000, p. 200) “Moods signal the states of the self in terms of the 
physical, psychological, and social resources available to meet perceived 
environmental demands. Moods operate as a cue in a self-regulatory system”. 
Thus, the functional view on mood highlight that moods may function as cues 
informing individuals on their general state of being.        
Valence Theory and the Affect Infusion Model 
Valence theory suggests that positive and negative mood will have distinct 
impact on cognitive processing and the perception of risk. Druckman and 
McDermott (2008), state that positive mood lead to risk-seeking behavior, 
whereas negative mood leads to risk-aversive behavior.  
Several findings indicate that positive mood increase risk taking, whereas 
negative mood is more likely to reduce risk-taking tendencies. A general finding 
stated by Blanchette and Richards (2010) is that people in positive mood estimate 
positive events as more likely, whereas people in a negative mood increase 
estimates of the likelihood for negative events. Schwarz and Clore (2003) argue 
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that when using their mood as information, decision makers misread their current 
mood as a response to the task of judgment, leading to favorable evaluations 
under positive mood and less favorable evaluations under negative mood.  
Other studies also provide evidence for the impact of positive mood on 
risk taking tendencies (Forgas, 1994; Forgas, 1995; Chou, Ho & Lee, 2007). Chou 
et al. (2007) found that individuals who were in a happy mood showed more risk 
taking tendencies than those who were in a sad mood. They explain their findings 
through the Affect Infusion Model (AIM) (Forgas, 1995), which asserts that 
people in a positive mood rely on positive cues in making judgments and are thus 
“…more likely to access thoughts prone to positive aspects of risky situations than 
those who are in a negative mood” (Chou et al., 2007, p. 310). Moreover, 
individuals in positive mood perceive the outcome of risky choices as more 
favorable, resulting in an increase in the willingness to take risks. People in 
negative mood, on the contrary, are more likely to see the world as a threatening 
place, and are therefore more likely to process information systematically and 
carefully in order to avoid potential losses (Chou et al., 2007).  
The Affect Heuristic  
Heuristics may be defined as general rules of thumb. Heuristics are 
cognitive shortcuts and simplifications of complicated judgments and decisions, 
which in many cases yield close approximations to an optimal answer suggested 
by normative theories (Plous, 1993). Relying on heuristics may in this sense 
reduce the time and effort required to make optimal judgments and decisions, and 
the decision made could often be the ‘correct’ response. However, relying on 
heuristics may have disadvantages as well. In certain instances, relying on 
heuristics will lead to systematic biased decisions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; 
Plous, 1993). 
Analyzing risk, alternatives and consequences are important in several 
decision-making contexts. However, reliance on mood could often be a quicker, 
easier and more effective way to navigate in an uncertain and complex decision 
environment. Using the experienced mood as information, and relying on the 
mood associated with a stimulus is often characterized as the affect heuristic 
(Slovic et al., 2005). According to Slovic et al. (2005), our mind consists of 
images that are tagged or marked to varying degrees of affect, and this ‘affect 
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pool’ contains of positive and negative markers that are consciously or 
unconsciously associated with these images. In other words, we rely on, or consult 
the affect pool in the process of making judgments, and affect might serve as cues 
for judgments.  
Numerous studies have shown support for the affect heuristic (e.g. Keller, 
Siegrist, & Gutscher, 2006; Siegrist, Keller, & Marie-Eve Cousin, 2006; Slovic et 
al., 2007). Furthermore, the affect heuristic also seems to have much in common 
with Epstein’s (1994) dual process theory (as intuitive processing is more 
emotionally driven), and the mood-as-information theory.  
Circumplex Model of Affect 
One of the most widely studied models exploring valence and affect is the 
circumplex model of affect (Remington, Visser, & Fabrigar, 2000). Building on 
work done by Schlosberg (1941; 1952, as cited in Remington et al., 2000), Russell 
(1980) conducted a study where students were told to sort 28 words describing 
moods, feelings, temporary states, affect, or emotions into one of eight categories 
labeled arousal, contentment, depression, distress, excitement, misery, pleasure, 
and sleepiness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 (Adopted from Russel 1980, p. 1164). 
 
Furthermore, in a second task, the participants were instructed to place the 
aforementioned categories into a circular order so that the words opposite each 
other on the circle describes opposite feelings and the words closer together on the 
circle described more similar feelings (Russell, 1980). Similar to expectations, 
Russell (1980) showed that the categories were placed in to the predicted circular 
order. Moreover, the 28 words were also shown to fall along the proposed 
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pleasure-displeasure and degree-of-arousal dimensions, indicating that “… 
laymen have a mental map of affective life on which they rely in a variety of 
situations” (Russell, 1980, p. 1170).  
Elaborating on Russell’s model (1980) Larson and Diener’s model 
propose that mood differ in high and low arousal and between negative and 
positive valence (Larson & Diener, 1992 as cited in Remington et al., 2000). As 
seen from the literature review on mood and risk, scholars have concluded that 
positive and negative mood have a distinct impact on judgments and decisions 
regarding risk. Contributing to our understanding of why decision makers in 
positive and negative mood make dissimilar decisions, studying underlying and 
interacting mechanisms such as cognitive processing becomes essential.  
The Interaction Between Mood and Cognitive Processing 
Until quite recently, cognitive processes have been studied in a vacuum, 
separately from moods, as if cognitive processes are immune from such influence 
(Blanchette & Richards, 2010). 
The majority of findings that have examined the effects of moods on 
cognitive processing have focused on a dual process framework (e.g., Chaiken, 
Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Several of these findings 
suggest that individuals in negative moods engage in more analytic processing, 
whereas individuals in positive moods engage in more intuitive processing (e.g., 
Cohen & Andrade, 2004; Tiedens & Linton, 2001). The “mood as information” 
approach is contributing to answering why positive and negative moods may 
trigger different cognitive processing paths. As negative mood may signal a threat 
to the achievement of desired goals, the situation calls for analytic processing. 
Positive mood on the other hand may signal that the situation is safe and, thus, 
that one has sufficient information to make a judgment (Bless, 2000; Schwarz, 
1990; Bless et al., 1996). 
It is suggested by the mood-as-information theorists that negative moods 
signals that something about the situation is problematic, and hence that 
information must be processed more carefully (Blanchette & Richards, 2010). 
Similarly, Schwarz and Clore (2003) propose that we usually feel bad when we 
encounter a threat of negative outcomes, and feel good when we are more certain 
that we will obtain positive outcomes. Hence, our moods reflect the state of our 
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environment. If mood is used as information, then being in a bad mood may signal 
that the situation is problematic, whereas being in a good mood may signal a 
benign situation. Schwarz and Clore (2003) states that our cognitive processing 
are tuned to meet the processing requirements apparently posed by the situation. 
In this sense, negative mood may foster analytic processing with attention to the 
details at hand. Positive moods on the other hand may foster intuitive processing, 
relying more on general knowledge structures and having less focused attention. 
With regards to moods and measures of time, Clore and Tamir (2002) found that 
participants in positive moods tended to exit the decision process relatively early, 
whereas those in negative mood analyzed the same information to a further extent 
before making a decision. 
Forgas (2001) attempts to explain how mood influences both what 
information is processed, and how this information is processed. His main 
argument is that positive and negative moods may function as heuristic cues that 
signal whether enough effort has been put forth to perform the task at hand. When 
in positive mood, individuals may produce suboptimal performance since they 
misread their mood state as an indication that they have put in enough effort to 
perform the task; negative mood may signal that more information is required to 
increase performance (George & Zhou, 2001, as cited in Forgas & George, 2001). 
 As theory and empirical research propose that there is an interaction 
between mood and cognitive processing, a key question arises regarding how 
these factors may interplay in relation to framing effects. 
Mood and Framing Effects 
 There is considerable literature on positive and negative mood and its 
effect on judgment and decision-making (Chou, Lee, & Ho, 2007). However, to 
our knowledge, little or no research has examined moods’ effect on risky choice 
framing, especially in concert with cognitive processing. As positive mood is 
suggested to trigger intuitive processing, and negative mood is proposed to trigger 
analytical processing, we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Induced mood will moderate the relationship between framing and 
response. Specifically: 
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Hypothesis 4a: Decision makers in positive mood will show classical 
framing effects; being risk aversive in the gain frame, and risk seeking in 
the loss frame.  
 
Hypothesis 4b: Decision makers in negative mood will be relatively 
insensitive to framing, and not show classical framing effects. 
 
As cognitive processing is suggested to account for the presumed 
moderating effect of mood, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 5: The moderating effect of mood on the relationship between framing 
and response will be mediated by cognitive processing, with the effect of positive 
mood being mediated by intuitive processing, and the effect of negative mood 
being mediated by analytical processing. 
 
Conceptual Research Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Validation and Operationalization 
Induced Mood, Self-Assessment and SCR 
Two manipulation checks will be applied to validate our mood 
manipulation, as elaborated on in the methodology section. The first manipulation 
check will be a self-assessment system. To validate our mood manipulation, we 
predict that induced positive mood will be related with high levels of self-reported 
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positive valence, whereas induced negative mood to be associated with lower 
levels of self-reported positive valence. 
The second mood manipulation that will be applied is measures of changes 
in electrodermal activity (EDA); skin conductance response (SCR), which 
measures the arousal dimension of mood, indicating its intensity (Figner & 
Murphy, 2011). SCR is frequently used within the field of judgment and decision 
making when measuring arousal, and the method will be presented more in depth 
in the methodology section. However, as validation of the mood inducement, we 
predict that there should be no significant difference in the scores of self-reported 
arousal in the positive and negative mood inducement conditions. We also predict 
that high levels of self-reported valence and arousal will be significantly related to 
higher levels of SCR.  
Cognitive Processing and Response-Time 
To validate our cognitive processing measures, we predict that decision 
makers that reports high levels of intuitive processing use significantly less 
response time, in contrast to decision makers reporting higher levels of analytical 
processing.  
 
Methodology 
In this section we will describe how we tested and investigated our 
research model and hypotheses empirically.  
Sample and Research Design 
Eighty-nine students from BI Norwegian Business School voluntary 
participated in the study. After removing outliers and participants with missing 
data on one or more key variables, we ended up with a final sample of eighty-one 
participants. The study had a lab-experimental design. We used a 2 (positive vs. 
negative mood) by 2 (gain vs. loss frame) mixed between- and within subject 
design, randomly assigning 20 or more participants to each of our four 
experimental conditions.  
Procedure and Key Variables 
The experiment was conducted in the research lab at BI Norwegian 
Business School, with the software E-Prime 2.0 installed on the computers at use. 
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E-Prime 2.0 is a psychology software tool designed for computerized 
experiments, which allows for millisecond precision timing to ensure accuracy of 
the data collected (Pst. Inc., 2012). Participants were presented with the original 
Asian disease scenario and the following two alternative intervention programs, 
which they were asked to choose among. Half of the participants in the negative 
mood condition were presented with the loss-framed programs, and the other half 
was presented with the gain-framed programs. The same procedure was followed 
for participants in the positive mood condition. After completing the task and 
filling out the questionnaires, as explained more thoroughly in the next section, 
participants were presented with the intervention programs of the opposite frame 
(gain/loss), following the exact same experimental procedure. To clarify, 
participants in both mood conditions received either the loss or gain frame first, 
and after completion (composing the between-subject design), they received the 
opposite frame (composing the within-subject design). 
Independent Variables: Mood and Scenario Framing 
 To manipulate the independent variable scenario framing, the alternatives 
were presented in terms of gains or losses, we used the original Asian disease 
scenario developed by Tversky and Kahneman (1981). 
 To induce and manipulate the independent variable mood, we applied two 
color photographs (Appendix 1) from the International Affective Picture System 
(IAPS), developed by the Center for Emotion and Attention (CSEA) at the 
University of Florida. The center provides standardized materials that are 
available for researchers who study emotions and mood, and the IAPS consists of 
photographs that are validated to induce affective states, including specific 
emotions and mood (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008). Our participants were 
presented with either a validated negative mood photograph (a starving child), or a 
validated positive mood photograph (a smiling, happy baby). Participants were 
instructed to focus on the screen at all times during the experiment. In addition we 
applied a focus point (“*”) in the middle of the screen using E-Prime 2.0, after 
they had pushed space to begin the experiment, to ensure that participants held 
their eyes on the computer screen when the photograph was displayed. The 
photograph was displayed for three seconds, before immediately receiving the 
Asian disease scenario. After providing their response and completing the 
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following questionnaires, participants were exposed to the exact same 
experimental mood inducement, before receiving the opposite framed alternatives 
(composing the within-subject design).  
Dependent Variables: Response and Cognitive Processing  
 The dependent variable response was recorded when participants indicated 
their decision to the Asian disease scenario by selecting the risk aversive or risk 
seeking option on the computer.  
After making their decision, participants were asked to fill out a 
questionnaire reflecting characteristics of their decision. The questionnaire 
consisted of 43 items formulated as statements ranging on a Likert-scale from 1 
(“I disagree”) to 5 (“I agree”), measuring the dependent and independent variable 
cognitive processing (Appendix 2). The questionnaire consisted of Sinclair’s 
(2004) two scales (13 items), and Bakken and Haerem’s (2011) three scales (30 
items) of analytic and intuitive processing. Haerem and Bakken (2011) developed 
and provided discriminant and convergent validity of the three scales, which 
includes items from the REI-factor (Rational-Experiential Inventory from Pacini 
& Epstein, 1999), a heuristic/holistic intuitive processing factor, and an affective 
intuitive processing factor. 
Control Variables 
 We also controlled for gender, and time. Time as a possible additional 
indicator of the type of cognitive processing that was employed during the 
judgment and decision making, as previously predicted that participants engaging 
in analytic processing might use more time before giving their response to the 
Asian disease scenario.  
Manipulation Checks  
 We applied two manipulation checks for mood inducement. One based on 
a self-assessment manikin (SAM), and the other measuring changes in 
electrodermal activity; skin conductance response (SCR). The two methods for 
manipulation checks are pretended in the following sections.  
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Self-Assessment Manikin 
  After being presented with the photograph and having made their decision 
relevant to the Asian disease scenario, all participants (N=81) received a self-
assessment questionnaire (Appendix 3) reflecting their mood reactions to the 
photograph. The self-assessment system is called the Self-Assessment Manikin 
(SAM), which is an affective rating system devised by Lang (1980, as cited in 
Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008). The system consists of graphic figures 
assessing the affective dimensions of valence (positive vs. negative mood) and 
arousal (low vs. high). Valence is presented to the participants as the dimension 
“Happy vs. Unhappy”, by figures ranging from a smiling, happy figure, to a 
frowning, unhappy figure. Arousal is presented as the dimension “Excitement vs. 
Calm”, and ranges from an excited, wide-eyed figure to a relaxed, sleepy figure. 
Participants were asked to place an “X” on one of the 5 figures compromising 
each scale, or between the figures that they found the most appropriate for the 
experienced mood reaction, resulting in a 9- point Likert scale for each dimension. 
Participants were asked to rate the picture as they actually felt while watching the 
picture, reflecting their immediate personal experience, and no more.  
Skin Conductance Response (SCR) 
 The skin has electric properties that are closely related to psychological 
processes. Changes in electrodermal activity (EDA) and skin conductance are 
related to changes in eccrine sweating on the volar surfaces, which in turn are 
strongly related to the activity in the sympathetic branch of the autonomic nervous 
system (Weber & Johnson, 2009). Accordingly, EDA measures have been widely 
used in the study of psychological processes related to sympathetic arousal 
(Figner & Murphy, 2011). Skin conductance is one form of EDA, and within the 
research field judgment and decision-making, SCR measures are frequently used 
as an indicator of affective processes and emotional arousal (Weber & Johnson, 
2009). Specifically, the term skin conductance refers to how well the skin 
conducts electricity when an external direct current of constant voltage is applied 
(Figner & Murphy, 2011). 
 The instrument we applied for measuring skin conductance is named 
“SudoLogger”, and is developed by the Norwegian company BioGauge AS 
(Appendix 4). BioGauge AS is a company that is dedicated to developing 
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bioimpedance techniques and instruments based on the latest results from 
international research (BioGauge, 2012). The SudoLogger technology is based on 
more than 30 years of active research at the University of Oslo, and is an 
instrument for objective measurement of SCR.  
Three electrodes were attached to participants’ hands, and the SCR-data 
were transmitted wirelessly to a nearby computer recording the measurements. 
The electrodes were attached to the participants 5 minutes prior to beginning the 
experiment, to ensure a good and stable electrical connection. Our initial plan was 
to collect SCR measurements from all participants in the study. However, the 
SudoLogger instruments were unfortunately delayed shortly after we had 
scheduled participants for the study and reserved the research lab at BI Norwegian 
Business School. When the SudoLogger instruments arrived, we collected SCR 
measurements from the final 20 participants in the study, resulting in 5 SCR 
measurements from each experimental condition.  
As suggested by other researchers studying SCR (e.g. Healey & Picard, 
2005), we applied two methods for preparing the SCR measurements for analyses. 
Method one was calculating the number of peaks of the SCR. We did this within 
four time frames. The four time frames were 1) during the three-second onset time 
of the picture presentation, 2) during a ten-second time frame starting from the 
picture onset time, 3) during the scenario onset time, and 4) during the total onset 
time of both the picture presentation and the scenario. Method two was calculating 
the sum of increments for the calculated peaks. We did this in the exact same four 
time frames. 
 
Results and findings 
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the dataset showed a total N of 89 participants. 
Four of the participants had missing values on one or more key variables and were 
therefore removed from the dataset. An additional four participants were removed 
because they had values outside the tolerable 3 points of standard deviation (Hair, 
Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010) on the variable time. This was a result of the 
software E-Prime 2.0 not stopping to record time, because these participants 
began answering the questionnaire before properly recoding their response. Final 
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descriptive statistics for the dataset showed a total N of 81, with 51 females and 
50 male respondents.  
Outliers and Normal Distribution 
As several of the statistical techniques performed to test our hypotheses 
are sensitive to outliers and assume that the distribution of scores on the 
dependent variables are ‘normal’ (Hair et al., 2010), we first assessed the 
normality of the data by using the explore option of descriptive statistics. The 
term normal describes a symmetrical, bell-shaped curve with greatest frequency of 
scores in the middle, with smaller frequencies towards the extremes (Gravetter & 
Wallnau, 2004). We inspected both Histograms and Boxplots and found no 
extreme outliers, except for the four values on the variable time that was 
improperly recorded and therefore removed. We compared all original means with 
the 5 % Trimmed Means of our dependent continuous variables and ensured that 
no extreme scores had a strong influence on the mean values (Hair et al., 2010). 
We investigated the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic to assess normality of the 
distribution of scores. Some of the variables did have significant values, 
suggesting a violation of the assumption of normality. Fortunately, most of the 
techniques are reasonably ‘robust’ or tolerant of violation of this assumption if the 
sample is larger than 30 participants (Hair et al., 2010). Moreover, further 
investigation of the actual shape of distribution in the Histograms, in addition to 
ensuring that the normal probability plots (Normal Q-Q) revealed reasonably 
straight lines, suggested a normal distribution of the data.  
Measures, Validation and Manipulation Checks 
 To validate and test the effects of our mood manipulation, we investigated 
our two manipulation checks; the self-assessment system, and measures from skin 
conductance response. 
Self-Assessment Manikin 
 Testing to ensure that our mood manipulation worked, we predicted that 
there would be a significant relationship between induced mood and self-reported 
valence. We ran linear regression to validate and test the mood manipulations, 
assessing the ability of induced mood to predict levels of self-reported valence. 
Inspecting the R-Square, induced mood explains 73.6 % of the variance in self-
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reported valence, indicating a success of the experimental manipulation with a β = 
-.85, p < .001 in the between-subject design. In the within-subject design, the R-
Square indicates that induced mood explains 71.8 % of the variance in self-
reported valence, indicating a success of the experimental manipulation with a β -
.84, p < .001. High levels of induced negative mood were able to predict high 
levels of self-reported negative valence (ratings on the lower side of the valence 
continuum), in both the between- and within-subject design.  
 To further validate the mood manipulation and compare the valence scores 
for participants in the negative and positive mood condition, an independent-
samples t-test was conducted. There was a significant difference in the scores for 
participants in the positive mood condition (M = 2.15, SD = 1.21) and participants 
in the negative mood condition (M = -2.30, SD = 1.48; t (81) = 14.66, p = .001, 
two-tailed). The magnitude of the difference in the means (mean difference = 
4.45, 95 % CI: 3.84 to 5.05) was large (eta squared = .74), providing additional 
support for a successful mood manipulation.  
We also predicted that there would be no significant differences in scores 
of self-reported arousal for the negative and positive mood condition. An 
independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the scores on arousal for 
positive and negative mood inducement. There was no significant difference in 
scores for induced positive mood (M = 4.19, SD = 1.73) and induced negative 
mood (M = 4.58, SD = 1.99; t (81) = -.948, p = .35, two-tailed).  
In sum, the findings reveal that as predicted, respondents in the positive 
mood condition reported higher levels of positive valence, whereas respondents in 
the negative mood condition reported higher levels of negative valence. 
Additionally, there were no significant differences in the levels of self-reported 
arousal between the mood conditions, indicating that both the positive and 
negative mood inducement had similar levels of experienced intensity. The results 
provide strong support for a validation of our mood manipulation.  
Skin Conductance Response  
 Regarding the second manipulation check, we predicted that high levels of 
self-reported valence and arousal would be significant predictors of higher levels 
of SCR. To provide further support for a validation of the mood manipulation and 
investigate the relationship with SCR, we ran linear regression. To run linear 
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regression, the guideline for the minimum ratio of observations to independent 
variables is 5:1 (Hair et al., 2010). As each of the independent variables valence 
and arousal consisted of a 9-point likert scale (potentially composing nine distinct 
groups), and since we did only have SCR-data from 20 participants, we divided 
the respondents into three categories of valence and arousal to fulfill the criterion 
of linear regression. On the valence continuum, responses were divided into the 
negative valence category (scoring from 1-4), the neutral category (scoring 5), and 
the positive valence category (scoring 6-9). The same procedure was followed for 
arousal, with low levels of arousal (1-4), medium levels of arousal (5) and high 
levels of arousal (6-9). Following, linear regression was performed to assess the 
ability of valence and arousal to predict levels of SCR.  
 The results showed that high levels of negative and positive self-reported 
valence was not found to be a significant predictor of higher levels of SCR, with 
no p values under .05, with the lowest reaching .136. Self-reported arousal, on the 
contrary, significantly accounted for variation in one of the SCR variables; 
picture-response, F (1, 40) = 6.59, p < .005, with a β = .24. Self-reported arousal 
was not able to significantly account for variation in the other three SCR 
variables, with the lowest p value reaching .072.  
In sum, self-reported valence was not able to predict levels of SCR. 
However, self-reported arousal was significantly related with higher levels of SCR 
among decision makers during the display of the mood inducing photographs.  
Factor Analysis of the Cognitive Processing Scales 
We conducted a principal component analysis in order to establish 
construct validity of Sinclair’s (2004) two scales (13 items) and Bakken and 
Haerem’s (2011) three scales (30 items) of analytic and intuitive processing. Since 
our study was part of a bigger research project where similar respondents was 
subject to similar types of experimental stimuli, we chose to include these data 
points in our analysis in order to increase the reliability of the results. 
Before performing analyses, the suitability of the correlation matrix for  
factor analysis was evaluated. A number of criterions were followed. First, 
according to Tabachnick and Fidell (2001), at least 300 cases are necessary to run 
factor analysis. Furthermore, Nunnally (1978) recommends a 10:1 ratio, were 10 
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cases are needed for each variable. As our dataset consisted of 635 cases (N = 
635) and a 14:1 ratio (43 variables), both sample size criterions were fulfilled.  
Second, as recommended by Tabachnick and Fidell (2001), an inspection of the 
correlation matrix was conducted to ensure that several of the coefficients were 
greater than .30. Finally, as a step in further assessment of the dataset for factor 
analysis, we applied the Barlett’s test of sphericity (Bartlett, 1954), and the 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy (Kaiser, 1970). The 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity was found to be significant (p < .05), and KMO was 
.89, reaching more than above the recommended value of .60, indicating the 
factorability of the correlation matrix. 
 A principal component analysis using promax rotation revealed a need to 
exclude a number of weak and cross-loading items. Subsequent to excluding these 
items, a 27-item questionnaire capturing five factors emerged. With eigenvalues 
exceeding 1, the five factors explained 24.4 %, 12.2 %, 8.2 %, 6.1 %, and 4.8 % 
(55.7 % of the total variance explained). Examining the scree plot, a sufficient 
break after the fifth factor was identified. Furthermore, a Parallel Analysis 
supported the retention of the five factors because they were the only factors with 
eigenvalues exceeding the corresponding criterion values for a randomly 
generated data matrix of the same size (27 variables x 635 respondents). 
Finally, a reliability analysis revealed that Sinclair’s two scales proved 
good coefficient alpha reliability estimates of .87 (analytic) and .80 (affective 
intuition). With regards to Bakken and Haerem’s three scales, acceptable 
coefficient alpha reliability estimates were found; .70 (analytic/double check), .77 
(heuristic intuition), and .81 (intuitive speed). Furthermore, a reliability analysis 
on the analytic and intuitive components combined, alpha coefficients reached .87 
for the analytic components and .80 for the intuitive components. These findings 
are in line with Bakken and Haerem’s (2011) and Sinclair’s (2004) predictions. 
Thus, the three variables of intuitive processing; intuitive speed, heuristic-holistic 
intuition and affect intuition, and the two variables of analytic processing; 
analytic-sinclair and analytic double-check, were retained in later analyses.   
 
Cognitive Processing and Time-Validation  
In order to further validate the cognitive processing measures, we 
predicted that decision makers reporting high levels of intuitive processing would 
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use significantly less response-time in relation to the Asian disease scenario, in 
contrast to decision makers reporting high levels of analytical processing. We 
correlated the cognitive processing variables with time, as seen in table 1.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
No significant relationships were detected in the between-subject design. 
Whereas the findings in the within-subject design indicate that intuitive 
processing was negatively correlated with time, and analytical processing was 
positively correlated with time. The findings were in line with our predictions.  
Effects 
 In this section we present the results from testing our research model and 
the hypotheses we derived at in our literature review.  
The Moderating Effects of Cognitive Processing 
 In H1 we predicted that cognitive processing would moderate the 
relationship between framing and response. We hypothesized that higher levels of 
intuitive processing would lead to classical framing effects, whereas higher levels 
of analytical processing would lead to no such framing effects. We centralized the 
variables, prior to creating the interaction terms, to improve their interpretability 
and to reduce the threat of multi-collinearity. 
Hierarchical binary logistic regression was performed to test the 
hypothesis. A summary of the analyses is displayed in table 2.  
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The analyses in the between-subject design yielded no significant effects, 
with the lowest p value of interaction effects reaching .060. In the within-subject 
design, two interaction effects were found to have a significant effect on response, 
general intuition (β 2.30, p < .030), and affect intuition (β 1.08, p < .009). High 
levels of general- and affect intuition were found to increase risk seeking 
tendencies when the scenario frame shifted from gain frame to loss frame, 
indicating that with higher levels of general and affect intuition, decision makers 
were more likely to demonstrate a preference shift; becoming more risk seeking in 
the loss frame. The findings indicate that general intuition and affect intuition had 
a moderating effect on the relationship between framing and response. 
Specifically, the interaction between framing and higher levels of intuition and 
affect intuition was significantly able to predict classical framing effects. 
Moreover, the interaction between framing and higher levels of analytical 
processing was not able to predict response. In other words, higher levels of 
analytical processing was not significantly associated with framing effects, 
providing support for H1.  
Framing and Cognitive Processing 
As suggested in the literature review, framing may have a distinct impact 
on cognitive processing. In our contradicting hypothesis (H2), we predicted the 
gain frame to be positively associated with higher levels of intuitive processing, 
and the loss frame to be positively associated with higher levels of analytical 
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processing. To investigate the potential differences between the two groups of 
frames, an independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the cognitive 
processing scores for the gain and loss frame.  
Contrary to our hypothesis, there was a significant difference in scores for 
gain frame (M = -.0920, SD = .549) and loss frame (M = .1753, SD = .555; t (81) 
= - 2.18, p = .032, two-tailed) in general intuition. There was also a significant 
difference in scores for gain frame (M = -.2034, SD = .745) and loss frame (M = 
.3037, SD = .921, t (81) = -2.72, p = .008, two-tailed) in intuitive speed. In 
contrast to our hypothesis, the findings indicate that decision makers engaged in 
more intuitive processing in the loss frame, in contrast to less intuitive processing 
in the gain frame. Thus, H2 were rejected.  
Cognitive Processing and Mediation 
We hypothesized the relationship between framing and response to be 
mediated by cognitive processing (H3). To test this hypothesis we followed the 
three steps of Baron and Kenny (1986). A variable function as a mediator when it 
fulfills three criteria: 1) The independent variable significantly accounts for the 
variation in the presumed mediator, 2) the mediator significantly accounts for the 
variation in the dependent variable, and 3) a previously significant relationship 
between the independent and dependent variable is no longer significant when the 
mediator is entered into the model. 
The first criterion is fulfilled as revealed by investigating H2, framing did 
significantly accounting for variation in cognitive processing. The second 
criterion is fulfilled as seen in findings from H1, with cognitive processing 
variables significantly accounting for variation in the dependent variable. Binary 
logistic regression was performed to test the third criterion. The results revealed 
that framing still was a significant predictor when the presumed mediators were 
entered into the model, violating the third criteria, meaning that we did not find 
support for mediation. Thus, H3 was rejected.  
Moods Moderating Effect on Framing  
We hypothesized that mood would moderate framing effects. Specifically, 
that participants in the positive mood condition would show a classical framing 
effect (H4a), whereas participants in negative mood would show no such framing 
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effect (H4b). Binary logistic regression was performed to test the relationships. 
Results are displayed in table 3. 
 
 
 
 
In step one, framing had a significant effect on response χ2 (1, N = 81) = 
11.26, p < .001 in the between-subject design, and in the within-subject design χ2 
(1, N =162) = 9.14, p < .003. However, induced mood was not found to have a 
direct effect on response, and the interaction effect of mood and framing on 
response was not found to be significant.  
We further investigated the impact of mood on framing effects by splitting 
the variable mood. As predicted, decision makers in the positive mood conditions 
were found to be risk-aversive in the gain frame, both in the between-subject 
design (β -1.163, p < .023), and in the within-subject design (β -.916, p < .007). 
However, no significant results were obtained in the loss frame, in the between- (p 
< .670), nor the within- (p < .547) subject design. Participants in the negative 
mood conditions were also found to be significantly risk aversive in the gain 
frame in the between-subject design (β -1.735, p < .006), but not in the within-
subject design (p < .082). The results yielded no significant framing effects for the 
participants in the negative mood condition in the loss frame, in both the within- 
(p < .413) and between-subject design (p < .166). 
As predicted, decision makers in positive and negative mood were found 
to be risk aversive in the gain frame. However, and contrary to expectations, 
positive mood was not able to predict risk seeking in the loss frame. Since there 
was no significant interaction effect between mood and framing, H4 was rejected.  
Mood and Cognitive Processing 
In H5 we hypothesized that induced mood would moderate the effect of 
framing and response, mediated by cognitive processing. To test for mediation, 
we followed the same three steps of Baron and Kenny (1986). An independent-
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samples t-test was conducted to explore the relationship between induced mood 
and cognitive processing. There was no statistical significant difference in the 
levels of cognitive processing between the positive and negative mood 
inducement conditions. The first criterion for mediation was therefore violated, 
and we have no support for H5. 
 
Post-Hoc Analyses 
Self-Reported Valence  
 In H5 we did not find support for induced mood to significantly account 
for variation in cognitive processing. Based on the assumption that it is not 
necessarily the mood inducement in itself that is related to cognitive processing, 
but rather subjects’ actual experienced mood as in self-reported valence; we 
investigated whether valence predicted levels of cognitive processing. Linear 
regression was performed to test the relationships. The results indicated that 
higher levels of positive valence significantly accounted for variation in the 
variables general analytic (β -.49, p < .001), analytic-sinclair (β -.51, p < .001), 
heuristic-holistic intuition (β -.28, p < .010), and intuitive speed (β .23, p < .035). 
The results indicate that participants reporting high levels of positive valence 
engaged in lower levels of analytical- and heuristic-holistic processing, and higher 
levels of intuitive cognitive processing.  
 To further investigate whether valence had a direct effect on response, or a 
moderating effect on the relationship between framing and response, binary 
regression analyses were performed. No significant results were obtained.  
Gender Effects 
 We also ran a binary logistic regression analysis investigating our control 
variable gender in relation to mood and framing. The results indicated that 
females did not show framing effects (p < .19), whereas males showed classical 
framing effects (p < .01), being risk aversive in the gain frame and risk seeking in 
the loss frame. We conducted an independent-samples t-test to investigate the 
relationship between gender and cognitive processing. There was a significant 
different scores for females (M = -.1284, SD = .741) and males (M = .1469, SD = 
.657; t (162) = -2.50, p = .013, two-tailed) in heuristic-holistic intuition, and for 
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females (M = -.1851, SD = .839) and males (M = 2037, SD = 925; t (162) = -2.80, 
p = .006, two-tailed) in intuitive speed, indicating the men were generally more 
intuitive than women.  
 
Discussion 
 Although recent reviews conclude that framing effects seems to be a 
robust finding, framing effects are not always obtained. Investigating under what 
conditions framing effects are most likely to occur, mood and cognitive 
processing were inspected as key variables as little research has been conducted 
on these variables effect on the relationship between framing and response.  
 Interestingly, and as predicted, the analyses from the lab-experiment 
provide support for the relationship between framing and response to be 
significantly moderated by cognitive processing. Decision-makers with high 
levels of intuition was found to use less response time, in addition to showing 
classical framing effects; preferring the risk aversive option in gain frame, and the 
risk seeking option in loss frame. In contrast to this, decision-makers reporting 
higher levels of analytical processing used more time in giving their response to 
the scenario, and were additionally not found to show classical framing effects. 
These findings are specifically obtained in the within-subject design, suggesting 
that interestingly, the effects are more likely to occur when the same decision-
maker solves more than one task. 
We expected this moderating effect of cognitive processing to be a result 
of the positive and negative mood induction. Results from the analyses provide 
support for a successful mood manipulation, partially by SCR levels in relation to 
self-reported arousal, and significantly with regards to self-reported valence in 
both mood conditions. Even though the findings provide support for a successful 
mood manipulation, mood was not found to moderate the relationship between 
framing and response, nor being able to predict levels of cognitive processing. 
However, post-hoc analysis revealed that self-reported valence was significantly 
able to predict levels of cognitive processing, with higher levels of positive 
valence being related to lower levels of analytical processing, and higher levels of 
intuitive processing. These findings add to our understanding that it is not 
necessarily mood treatment, but rather the decision-makers actual experienced 
mood that influence cognitive processing.  
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 Even though cognitive processing moderated the relationship between 
framing and response, we did not find sufficient support for mediation, meaning 
that other factors may be at play. We also found males to engage in higher levels 
of intuitive processing, and showing classical framing effects. Mood may have a 
distinct impact on gender, especially regarding cognitive processing, and further 
research is needed to understand these interactions. 
 Concerning the results for classical framing effects for the sample as a 
whole, we found decision makers to be significantly risk aversive in the gain 
frame, in line with previous research (e.g. Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; McElroy 
& Seta 2003; Xie & Wang 2003). We did, however, not find decision makers to 
be significantly risk seeking in the loss frame. A possible explanation for this 
finding is the influence of mood inducement. In line with expectations, we 
predicted that negative mood would not be related to risk seeking. Moreover, Isen 
and Patrick (1983) argue that individuals in a positive mood also may be generally 
risk aversive. They found that individuals strived to maintain their positive 
affective states. The mood maintenance hypothesis suggests that when in a 
positive mood, individuals are not willing to take risks, as this may result in a loss 
and thereby threaten their positive affective states. In a similar line of though, the 
positive mood experienced by our participants could have resulted in a more 
cautious and risk-aversive behavior when presented with the risky option in the 
Asian disease scenario.  
Furthermore, Druckman and McDermott (2008) distinguish between 
negative valence and argue that anger encourage greater risk seeking, while 
distress encourage a more cautious approach. It is reasonable to assume that our 
negative mood induction may have triggered distress, rather than anger. Thus, in 
line with Druckman and McDermott (2008), decision makers in the negative 
mood conditions had a more cautions approach to risk in both the gain and loss 
frame. Moreover, Mano (1992) found participants high in negative affect to be 
more risk aversive in a loss domain than individuals low in negative affect. He 
explains these findings stating that individuals in a negative state of mind might 
by aiming at not worsening their already negative state of mind, resulting in self-
defending mechanisms.  
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Future Research 
 Further research is needed to more extensively understand the influence of 
moods on risk, judgments and decisions. There is mixed evidence for whether 
positive and negative mood is associated with risk seeking or risk aversive 
behavior. Future research should shift focus by going beyond valence theory, 
beginning to investigate not necessarily how mood, but rather specific emotions 
influence framing effects and risky decisions.  
Furthermore, as we did only find partial support for the use of SCR, 
researchers should continue to investigate SCR in concert with additional types of 
stimuli for mood induction, attempting to gain a more extensive understanding of 
the use of SCR in judgment and decision making research.  
Moreover, there seems to be a relationship between mood, gender, and 
cognitive processing, which needs closer inspection in order to fully understand 
what accounts for these gender differences.  
Limitations 
A limitation to this study is the low levels of data collected from SCR 
measures. According to Figner & Murphy (2011), “it is well established that SCR 
covariates with the arousal dimension of affect, indexing its intensity” (p. 10). As 
a result of the delay of the SCR instruments, only one fourth of the participants 
were measured with SCR. It is reasonable to assume that an increase in the SCR 
sample could have led to more significant results. Additionally, more significant 
results could have been obtained if other stimuli of mood induction were applied. 
According to Finger and Murphy (2011), stronger stimuli such as videos with 
sound can trigger more reliable SCR measures than more subtle stimuli. 
Furthermore, alternately of displaying the mood inducing photographs for 3 
seconds, the picture could have been displayed during the entire scenario decision. 
Other researchers (e.g, Shiomura, & Atsumi 2001; Hirt et al. 1999) have used 
sound or shown movie clips in order to manipulate mood. Perhaps such 
adjustments would have triggered stronger measures of SCR among or 
participants.  
Clearly, another implication is not having a control group. By having a 
control group that did not receive any mood inducement, stronger implications 
from the lab-experiments could have been drawn.  
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Another limitation to the study is that the experiment was conducted in 
English, even though most of our participants have Norwegian as their mother 
tongue. According to Keysar, Hayakawa, and An (2012), framing effects are not 
always obtained when choices are presented in a foreign tongue. Hence, language 
barriers might explain why framing effects was not always obtained in our 
experimental conditions.  
Moreover, problem relevance is generally shown to influence decisions in 
relation to framing. As the scenario frames were not necessarily relevant for the 
decision-makers, they may have been more risk aversive (Wang & Johnston, 
1995).  
 
Practical implications 
In organizations, and everyday life alike, an understanding of how 
individuals make decisions is important as such knowledge could foster better 
decision making. This study has contributed to enhanced knowledge within the 
field of judgment and decision making, as underlying mechanisms such as 
cognitive processing may have an influence on framing effects. Relating this to an 
organizational setting, such knowledge is important as wrong risk-assessments 
could have fatal consequences for an organization. Business proposals could be 
framed and presented as gains or losses for key decision-makers in an 
organization. Thus, it becomes increasingly important to acknowledge that 
framing may influence our judgments and decisions regarding risk, especially in 
combination with intuition, like time pressure and the need for snap judgments.  
Moreover, in decisions involving high risk, individuals with a preference for 
intuitive processing might come to biased conclusions as they do evaluate the 
information presented based on heuristic cues.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
Ever since Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) now famous work on framing 
effects, several studies have supported framing effects to be a reliable 
phenomenon. The underlying reasons for why framing effects occur are more 
debatable. As mood and cognitive processing are found to influence judgments 
and decisions, and to work in concert to guide reasoning and decision making, we 
examined whether these variables could contribute to explaining why framing 
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effects occur. Mood did not moderate the relationship between framing and 
response. With that said, we did find self-reported valence to account for variation 
in cognitive processing. Cognitive processing was also found to moderate framing 
effects, as predicted. Intuitive processing was associated with classical framing 
effects, whereas analytical processing was associated with no framing effects.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Picture Manipulation, Positive Mood 
 
Picture Manipulation, Negative Mood 
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Appendix 2: Cognitive Processing Questionnaire 
 
Questionnaire 1: 
 
Subject numer:   ________________ 
Session number: _______________ 
 
Think back on the Asian disease scenario decision you just made on the 
computer and please answer the following questionnaire. Your response will be 
treated confidentially.  
 
Gender:  
Male    
Female  
For each statement below, indicate on the scale whether you agree or disagree 
with the statement, from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree 
 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
I evaluated systematically all key uncertainties       
I considered carefully all alternatives       
When making decisions, I considered all options       
I analyzed all available information in detail       
I made the decision in a logical and systematic way       
I can describe step-by-step how I made my decision       
I considered all consequences of my decision       
Before I started deliberating, I double-checked the available 
information to make sure I had the right facts  
     
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
I based the decision on my inner feelings and reactions       
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 1 2 3 4 5 
It was more important for me to feel that the decision were 
right than to have rational reasons for them  
     
I relied on my instinct       
I made the decision because it felt right to me       
I knew the answer before I started analyzing the data       
 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
There was little need to examine detailed information       
I had enough knowledge to make the best decision almost 
immediately  
     
I only examined the information that was relevant in the 
situation  
     
I based my decision on the overall picture       
My knowledge of similar situations led me to quickly recognize 
a solution  
     
I took time to read all available information carefully before 
making the decision  
     
I double-checked the description of the situation before making 
the decision  
     
There was little need to think because I know ”how things 
work” in this kind of situation  
     
I decided on the first solution that I could think of       
It was easy to get a clear picture of what needed to be done       
When I had made a decision there was no doubt that this was 
the right action to take  
     
I would be very surprised if my decision turned out to be wrong       
It was easy to make a quick decision because the alternatives 
looked very similar  
     
It was better to make a quick and perhaps faulty decision than 
making the decision too late  
     
If I made a mistake I would make sure that I did not make the 
same mistake again  
     
I did all I could in order to avoid mistakes       
It was more important to avoid violation of formal rules and 
procedures than to make a quick decision  
     
I could easily imagine the consequences of my decision       
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 1 2 3 4 5 
I focused only on the most important information       
I knew my decision was correct even if I cannot explain my 
reasoning in detail  
     
If the information was conflicting I tried to look for additional 
information that could disconfirm my assumptions  
     
Even if the information was uncertain I tried to make a quick 
decision  
     
If I was uncertain about what to do I tried to look for 
information that would narrow the choices  
     
It was more important to make a quick decision than to wait for 
additional information  
     
Before I made my decision I tried to think if there was any 
information that could challenge my assumptions  
     
It was more important to make a quick decision than to think 
about all possible consequences  
     
I did not make any decision until I had thought about all 
possible outcomes, even if some were highly unlikely  
     
When I had made up my mind about what to do, I did not 
hesitate to put things into action  
     
 
Even if a decision seemed obvious I took time to think through 
if I might have overlooked something  
     
When I first got the idea of how to do it, I acted immediately       
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Appendix 3: SAM Questionnaire 
 
Here you will rate the picture you have just seen. As you can see below, there are 
2 sets of 5 figures, each arranged along a continuum. We call this set of figures 
”SAM”, and you will be using these figures to rate how you felt while viewing the 
picture (the smiling baby). There is no right or wrong answers, so simply respond 
as honestly as you can.  
 
SAM shows two different kinds of feelings: Excitement vs. Calm and Happy vs. 
Unhappy. The Excitement - Calm rating refers to how aroused you feel when 
viewing the picture. The Happy - Unhappy rating refers to whether you 
experience positive feelings or negative feelings when viewing the picture.  
 
Please circle around the numbers below to indicate how you felt when viewing the 
picture. 
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Appendix 4: Equipment used to measure SCR (”Sudologger”). 
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Abstract 
 For our master thesis we want to investigate moods’ impact on cognitive 
processing and framing effects. Based on our literature review on the relationships 
between moods, cognitive processing, decision-making and framing, we identified 
a need for understanding when framing effects are most likely to occur. As moods 
and cognitive processing are suggested to influence judgment and decision-
making, and few studies examine the effects of moods or cognitive processing on 
framing effects - these variables will be of interest in our study. Based on theory 
and empirical findings we derive at our hypotheses. We intend to conduct a lab 
experiment to test our hypotheses; the method and operationalization will be 
presented.  
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1.0.1 Introduction 
There is a growing amount of evidence that moods and affective states 
influence judgment and decision-making (Blanchette & Richards, 2010). The role 
of mood and affective states in decision making under risk are also receiving 
increased attention (e.g., Peters, 2006; Kobbeltved, 2005). More recently, 
researchers have become interested in the role of anticipatory moods; as 
experienced during the decision-making process, in contrast to previous studies 
examining anticipated moods; those expected to result from the consequences of a 
decision (Wang, 2006; Loewenstein, Hsee, Weber, & Wlech, 2001).  
A considerable amount of studies have examined the effects of positively 
and negatively valenced mood on judgment and decision-making (Chou, Lee, & 
Ho, 2007). Several of these findings suggest that negative and positive moods 
have a distinct impact on information processing. People in positive mood are 
often found to increase reliance on experiential processing, whereas people in 
negative mood are found to engage in systematic processing (e.g., Cohen & 
Andrade, 2004; Blanchette & Richards, 2010; Tiedens & Linton, 2001). It is 
generally suggested that moods and cognitive evaluations work in concert to guide 
reasoning and decision-making (Loewenstein et al., 2001). 
One of the most successful behavioural models for decision-making under 
risk is Tversky and Kahneman’s prospect theory (Trepel, Fox, & Poldrack, 2005). 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) argue that our choices will be influenced by how 
prospects are cognitively represented, which is also referred to as framing effects. 
Although recent reviews of framing conclude that framing effects seems to be a 
robust finding, framing effects are not always obtained. What becomes a key 
question is under what conditions framing effects are most likely to occur 
(McElroy & Seta, 2003). There are some findings indicating that systematic 
processing may moderate framing effects, suggesting that participants engaging in 
systematic processing does not show framing effects (e.g., McElroy & Seta, 2003; 
Simon, Fagley & Halleran, 2004) As mood and cognitive processes are suggested 
to work in concert, and since relatively little research examines how moods or 
information processing moderates the effect of framing, we derive at our research 
question: 
How does mood affect cognitive processing and framing effects? 
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1.0.2 Conceptual model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.0.3 Intended contribution 
 Our intended contribution is to more extensively understand some of the 
contextual factors that may influence framing effects, specifically by studying 
how mood meditated by cognitive processing may moderate the effects of 
framing. By examining the underlying mechanisms that might influence framing 
effects, we intend to contribute to prospect theory and the research field of 
judgment and decision-making.  
 
2.0.1 Theory and hypotheses 
 
2.0.2 Defining affect, emotion and mood 
According to Forgas (1995) there is some disagreement about how to define terms 
such as affect, emotions, and mood. However, he defines affect as a more general 
label that refers to both moods and emotion. Emotions might be defined as 
“…intense, short-lived and usually have a definite cause and clear cognitive 
content (e.g. anger or fear)” (Forgas 1992, as cited in Forgas 1995, p. 41). The 
main focus of this paper, however, is mood which could be defined as “low-
Induced 
  Mood 
       Response        Framing 
      Cognitive  
      Processing 
Master Thesis  GRA 19003  
3 
 
intensity, diffuse and relatively enduring affective states without a salient 
antecedent cause and therefore little cognitive content (e.g. feeling good or feeling 
bad)” (Forgas 1992, as cited in Forgas 1995, p. 41). 
 
2.0.3 Moods and risk 
Scholars within the field of decision making usually view risk as “… 
increasing with the variance in the probability distribution of possible outcomes” 
(Trepel et al., 2005, p. 35). Much of the previous research of choice under risk 
have focused on cognitive aspects with little emphasize on how affect might 
influence risk assessments (Loewenstein et al., 2001; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; 
Wang, 2006). More recently, the influence of affect on risk has been studied more 
extensively (Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Kobbeltved et al., 2005; Peters et al., 2006; 
Wang, 2006; Blanchette and Richards, 2010), with the valence approach as the 
most dominant theory (Lerner and Keltner, 2000). Valence theory suggests that 
positive and negative moods will have different impact on information processing 
and the perception of risk. Trepel et al. (2005) defines individuals who are risk 
aversive as someone who “…prefers a sure payment to a risky prospect of equal 
or higher expected value” (p. 35). Risk seeking, on the contrary, is defined as 
someone who “…prefers a risky prospect to a sure payment of equal or higher 
expected value (Trepel et al., 2005, p. 35). Druckman and McDermott (2008), 
state that positive emotions might lead to risk-seeking behavior, whereas negative 
emotions might lead to risk-aversive behavior.  
Several findings indicate that positive mood increase risk taking, whereas 
negative mood is more likely to reduce risk-taking tendencies. A general finding 
stated by Blanchette & Richards (2010) is that people in positive moods estimate 
positive events as more likely, whereas people in negative moods increase 
estimates of the likelihood for negative events. Schwarz & Clore (2003) argue that 
when using their mood as information, participants misread their current moods as 
a response to the task of judgment, leading to favorable evaluations under positive 
moods and less favorable evaluations under negative moods.  
One of the most widely studied models exploring valence and affect is the 
circumplex model of affect (Remington, Visser, & Fabrigar, 2000). Building on 
work done by Schlosberg (1941; 1952 as cited in Remington, Visser, & Fabrigar, 
2000) Russell (1980) conducted a study where students were told to sort 28 words 
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describing moods, feelings, temporary states, affect, or emotions into one of eight 
categories labeled arousal, contentment, depression, distress, excitement, misery, 
pleasure, and sleepiness. Furthermore, in a second task, the participants were 
instructed to place the aforementioned categories into a circular order so that the 
words opposite each other on the circle describes opposite feelings and the words 
closer together on the circle described more similar feelings (Russell, 1980). 
Similar to expectations, Russell (1980) showed that the categories were placed in 
to the predicted circular order. Moreover, the 28 words were also shown to fall 
along the proposed pleasure-displeasure and degree-of-arousal dimensions, 
indicating that “… laymen have a mental map of affective life on which they rely 
in a variety of situations” (Russell, 1980, p. 1170). Elaborating on Russell’s model 
(1980) Larson and Diener’s model propose that emotions differ in high and low 
arousal and between negative and positive valence (Larson and Diener, 1992 as 
cited in Remington et al., 2000). More recently, research has begun to examine 
how emotions of the same valence differ with respect to how individual’s asses’ 
risk (Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Blanchette and Richards, 
2010). However, examining possible effects of specific emotions will not be the 
focus of this study.  
Other studies also provide evidence for the impact of positive mood on 
risk taking tendencies (Forgas, 1994; Forgas, 1995; Chou, Ho & Lee, 2007). Chou 
et al. (2007) found that individuals who were in a happy mood showed more risk 
taking tendencies than those who were in a sad mood. They explain their findings 
through the affect infusion model (Forgas, 1995), which asserts that people in a 
positive mood rely on positive cues in making judgments and are thus “…more 
likely to access thoughts prone to positive aspects of risky situations than those 
who are in a negative mood” (Chou et al., 2007, p. 310). Moreover, individuals in 
positive moods perceive the outcome of risky choices as more favorable, resulting 
in an increase in the willingness to take risks. People in negative mood, on the 
contrary, are more likely to see the world as a threatening place, and are therefore 
more likely to process information systematically and carefully in order to avoid 
potential losses (Chou et al., 2007).  
 
2.0.4 The affect heuristic  
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Heuristics may be defined as general rules of thumb. Heuristics are 
cognitive shortcuts and simplifications of complicated judgments and decisions, 
which in many cases yield close approximations to an optimal answer suggested 
by normative theories (Plous, 1993). Relying on heuristics may in this sense 
reduce the time and effort required to make optimal judgments and decisions, and 
the decision made could often be the ‘correct’ response. However, relying on 
heuristics may have disadvantages as well. In certain instances, relying on 
heuristics will lead to systematic biased decisions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; 
Plous, 1993). 
Analyzing risk, alternatives and consequences are important in several 
decision-making contexts. However, reliance on affect and feelings could often be 
a quicker, easier and more effective way to navigate in an uncertain and complex 
decision environment. Using the experienced mood as information, and relying on 
the feelings associated with a stimulus is often characterized as the affect heuristic 
(Slovic et al., 2005). According to Slovic et al. (2005), our mind consists of 
images that are tagged or marked to varying degrees of affect, and this ‘affect 
pool’ contains of positive and negative markers that are consciously or 
unconsciously associated with these images. In other words, we rely on, or consult 
the affect pool in the process of making judgments, and affect might serve as cues 
for judgments.  
Numerous studies have shown support for the affect heuristic (Keller, 
Siegrist, & Gutscher, 2006; Siegrist, Keller, & Marie-Eve Cousin, 2006; Slovic et 
al., 2007). Furthermore, the affect heuristic also seems to have much in common 
with Epstein’s (1994) dual process theory, which assumes that individuals process 
information through two parallel and interactive systems; a rational systematic 
system and an emotionally driven experiential system. The dual process theory 
will be elaborated on in a later section. Interesting to note here is the affective 
component of the experiential system. According to Slovic et al., (2007) “the 
experiential system encodes reality images, metaphors, and narratives to which 
affective feelings have become attached” (p. 1344). Moreover, Damasio (1994, as 
cited in Slovic et al., 2005) also recognize that affect is essential to rational action. 
Thus, there seems to be some similarities between Epstein’s (1994) dual process 
theory and the affect heuristic. The affect heuristic has also much in common with 
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the risk as feelings hypothesis, which will be explained in the following section 
(Slovic et al., 2004).  
 
2.0.5 Risk as feelings 
Loewenstein and his colleagues have developed the risk as feeling hypothesis, 
which state that individuals’ response to risky situations are partially influenced 
by emotions, including feelings such as worry, fear, dread, or anxiety 
(Loewenstein et al., 2001). Furthermore, they distinguish between anticipatory 
emotions, immediate reaction to risk (e.g., fear, anxiety, dread) and anticipated 
emotions which are typically not experienced in the immediate present but rather 
experienced in the future (Loewenstein et al., 2001). Whereas previous research 
within the field of judgment and decision making have addressed anticipated 
emotions, the risk as feelings hypothesis includes anticipatory emotions during the 
decision making process (Loewenstein et al., 2001). Thus, they emphasize not 
only the effects of emotions experienced after a decision but also acknowledge the 
impact of emotions experienced during the decision-making process. Furthermore, 
Slovic et al. (2005) emphasize that risk is perceived and acted on in two ways; 
risk as feelings and risk as analysis. They explain risk as feelings as individuals’ 
fast, instinctive, and intuitive reaction to danger, whereas risk as analysis brings 
logic, reason, and scientific deliberation to bear on risk management (Slovic et al., 
2005). Clearly, this distinction between risk as feelings and risk as analysis also 
has much in common with Epstein’s (1994) dual process theory. Whereas risk as 
feelings is closely related to the characteristics of the experiential system, risk as 
analysis is closely related to the analytical and systematic system.    
 
2.0.6 Prospect theory 
Before Tversky and Kahneman (1979) developed the prospect theory, 
expected utility theory was the dominant theory of decision making under risk 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Expected utility 
theory was originally developed to provide an explicit set of assumptions that 
underlie rational decision making (Plous, 1993). This theory proposes that 
decision makers have complete information about the probabilities and 
consequences of each alternative when making a decision (Plous, 1993). In 
addition, expected utility theory assumes that the decision maker understands this 
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information and are able to calculate the advantages and disadvantages of their 
alternatives, in order to maximize their expected utility (Plous, 1993).   
Expected utility theory was proposed as a normative theory of behavior 
(Plous, 1993). Developed as a critique of expected utility theory, Tversky and 
Kahneman’s prospect theory rather looked at how individuals actually behaved 
under decision making involving risk (Tversky & Kahneman, 1979). In other 
words, their findings invalidated the expected utility theory as a descriptive model 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1979). Furthermore, the prospect theory uses the term 
value instead of utility, implying that in decisions involving risk individuals 
consider the gains and losses of each alternative. Put differently, this value 
function is defined on deviation from a reference point (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1979). Moreover, as seen from the figure below, prospect theory predicts a value 
function that is generally concave for gains and convex for losses, implying that 
individuals tend to be risk aversive in gain frame and risk seeking in loss frame 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; McElroy & Seta, 2003; Xie & Wang, 2003).  
 
 
Adopted from Tversky and Kahneman, 1979 
 
This could further be exemplified through the notion that “displeasure associated 
with losing a sum of money is generally greater than the pleasure associated with 
winning the same amount” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, p. 454).  
 
2.0.7 Framing 
According to expected utility theory the way a problem is framed should 
not influence the choices made by the decision maker (Plous, 1993; McElroy & 
Seta, 2003). On the contrary, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) demonstrated that 
how a decision problem is framed will influence individual’s tendencies to either 
be risk aversive or risk seeking. Moreover, they define a decision frame as 
referring “… to the decision-maker’s conception of the acts, outcomes, and 
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contingencies associated with a particular choice (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, p. 
453). In order to demonstrate decision frames in decision theory, Tversky and 
Kahneman (1981) developed the Asian disease problem. In the Asian disease 
problem participants are asked to imagine the outbreak of an unusual Asian 
disease in the US, which is expected to kill 600 people. Next, they are presented 
with two programs to combat the disease and asked to choose the program they 
favor (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Half of the participants are presented with 
the gain framed programs, A and B, whereas the other half of the participants are 
presented with loss framed programs, C and D (Hærem et al., 2010). Gain frame 
refers to a situation where individuals perceive possible gain. On the contrary, loss 
frame refers to a situation where individuals perceive the possibility of loss. The 
different preference reversals showed in these two frames is referred to as a 
framing effect (Xie & Wang, 2003; Kühberger & Tanner, 2010). The four 
programs in the Asian disease problem are presented as: 
 
A: If program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. 
B: If program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved, 
and 2/3 probability that no people will be saved. 
 
C: If program C is adopted 400 people will die. 
D: If program D is adopted there is 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and 2/3 
probability that 600 people will die (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). 
 
Although the expected outcomes of problem A and B, and C and D are 
mathematically the same, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) showed that individuals 
tend to be risk-aversive in gain frame and risk seeking in loss frame. In fact, 72 % 
of the participants choose the safe program A over the more risky program B in 
the gain frame. When the program was framed as loss, however, 78 % preferred 
the risk seeking option (program D) (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). This 
preference reversal is explained as a result of a framing effect (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981).  
Several studies support the framing effect as a reliable phenomenon 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; Wang, 1996; Kühberger, 1998). However, more 
recent reviews “…have concluded that although there is a moderately strong 
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framing effect for manipulations that follow the Asian disease paradigm, framing 
effects are not always obtained” (McElroy & Seta, 2003, 611). For instance, 
Hærem et al. (2010) conducted four experiments to explore the robustness of risky 
choice framing among military decision makers. The classical Asian disease 
scenario was used in the first experiment, whereas a military scenario was 
developed and used in the three other experiments in order to make the scenario 
more relevant to military officers. The structure and choice alternatives were 
identical to the classical Asian disease scenario (Hærem et al. 2010).  In contrast 
to Tversky and Kahneman (1981), who found a bidirectional framing effect, risk 
aversive in gain frame and risk seeking in loss frame, Hærem et al. (2010) found a 
unidirectional framing effect implying that the participants were risk seeking in 
both domains. One plausible reason for these findings could be the cultural and 
contextual factor that influences military decision makers (Hærem et al., 2010). 
Wang and Johnston (1995) also found support for this unidirectional framing 
effect. In this study they proved that participants was more risk-seeking, in both 
domains, when a decision problem was described in a more personal relevant 
family context (Wang & Johnston, 1995).   
 
2.0.8 Moods’ effect on decision-making and framing 
 There is considerable literature on positively and negatively valenced 
mood and its effect on judgment and decision-making (Chou, Lee, & Ho, 2007). 
However, to our knowledge, not much research has examined moods’ effect on 
framing. Although risk is a central topic within the research field of judgment and 
decision-making, the decision-theoretic approach to decision making under risk 
has largely ignored the role played by emotions, especially the impact of moods or 
emotions experienced during the decision-making process (Loewenstein et al., 
2001). More recently, there has been a growing interest in the role played by 
moods and emotions in decision making under risk (Wang, 2006).  
 Shiomura, & Atsumi (2001) examined the effects of moods on framing. 
They used pleasant music or an unpleasant sound to induce positive or negative 
mood, and their findings indicate that participants in the positive mood condition 
showed classical framing effects, in contrast to the negative mood condition 
where no framing effect was found. Based on the theory on mood, framing and 
decision-making, we derive at our first hypothesis: 
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H1.) Participants in negative mood will be relatively insensitive to 
framing, compared to participants in positive mood. 
 
2.0.9 Dual Processing 
As opposed to expected utility theory there is a growing amount of 
evidence indicating that humans do not always process information in a 
deliberative and rational way, but rather that humans process information and 
make decisions in many different ways.  
Several researchers have described two different modes of cognitive 
processing where one is systematic and analytical, and the other is experiential 
(e.g., Epstein, 1994; Kahneman, 2002; Mukherjee, 2010; Sloman, 1996; Slovic, 
Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004; Stanovich & West, 2000). According to 
Sanfey, Loewenstein, McClure, & Cohen (2006) “there is a long legacy of 
research within psychology, strongly supported by findings from neuroscience, to 
suggest human behavior is not the product of a single process, but rather reflects 
the interaction of different specialized subsystems” (p. 111). While the systematic 
system is slow, serial, controlled, effort-full, rule governed, flexible, and neutral, 
the experiential system is fast, intuitive, parallel, automatic, effortless, associative, 
slow learning, and emotional (Kahneman, 2002). There is no doubt about the 
evolutionary value of the experiential system as it allows us to make snap and 
efficient judgments and decisions of our environment.  
More recently, some researchers have suggested that experiential 
processing may consist of several distinct aspects of intuition (e.g. Pretz & Totz, 
2007). Glöckner & Witteman (2010) stress the fact that dual-process models 
assume a clear distinction between experiential/intuitive and systematic processes, 
but do not provide further differentiation within both categories. They propose 
that empirical testing should differentiate between cognitive processes subsumed 
in the category of intuition, to gain better understanding of the processes and 
allow for more specific predictions. A distinction is made between heuristic and 
holistic aspects of intuition. Heuristic intuition refers to trust in snap judgments, 
and first impressions, whereas holistic intuition refers to a preference for abstract, 
holistic integration of complex information, and reliance on incubation in decision 
making (Pretz & Totz, 2007). Defining the concept of intuition, and 
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opertationalizing it efficiently remains a challenge, and we need to know more 
about the role of mood and emotions in the intuitive process (Langan-Fox & 
Shirley, 2011).  
 
 
2.1.0 The effect of mood on cognitive processing 
Until quite recently, cognitive processes have been studied in a vacuum, 
separately from moods or emotions, as if cognitive processes are immune from 
such influence (Blanchette & Richards, 2010). 
The majority of findings that have examined the effects of moods on 
cognitive processing have focused on a dual process framework (e.g., Chaiken, 
Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Several of these findings 
suggest that individuals in negative moods engage in a more systematic 
processing, whereas individuals in positive moods engage more in experiential 
processing (e.g., Cohen & Andrade, 2004; Tiedens & Linton, 2001). The “mood 
as information” approach is contributing to answering why positive and negative 
moods may trigger different cognitive processing paths. As negative mood may 
signal a threat to the achievement of desired goals, the situation calls for 
systematic processing. Positive mood on the other hand may signal that the 
situation is safe and, thus, that one has sufficient information to make a judgment 
(Bless, 2000; Schwarz, 1990; Bless et al., 1996). Based on these hypotheses 
researchers have found consistent evidence that participants in negative or sad 
moods tend to further scrutinize information and carry out systematic information 
processing before making judgments, whereas participants in positive mood rely 
more on experiential processing (e.g. Cohen & Andrade, 2004; Forgas, 2001; 
Blanchette & Richards, 2010). 
It is suggested by the mood-as-information theorists that negative moods 
signals that something about the situation is problematic, and hence that 
information must be processed more carefully (Blanchette & Richards, 2010). 
Similarly, Schwarz & Clore (2003) propose that we usually feel bad when we 
encounter a threat of negative outcomes, and feel good when we are more certain 
that we will obtain positive outcomes. Hence, our moods reflect the state of our 
environment. If mood is used as information, then being in a bad mood may signal 
that the situation is problematic, whereas being in a good mood may signal a 
Master Thesis  GRA 19003  
12 
 
benign situation. Schwarz & Clore (2003) states that our cognitive processing are 
tuned to meet the processing requirements apparently posed by the situation. In 
this sense, sad moods may foster systematic processing with attention to the 
details at hand. Happy moods on the other hand may foster experiential 
processing, relying more on general knowledge structures and having less focused 
attention.  
In the same line of thought, Forgas (2001) presents an affect infusion 
model (AIM), which attempts to explain how affect influences both what 
information is processed, and how this information is processed. His main 
argument is that positive and negative moods may function as heuristic cues that 
signal whether enough effort has been put forth to perform the task at hand. When 
in positive mood, individuals may produce suboptimal performance since they 
misread this affective state as an indication that they have put in enough effort to 
perform the task; negative mood may signal that more information is required to 
increase performance (George & Zhou, 2001, as cited in Forgas & George, 2001). 
With regards to moods and measures of time, Clore & Tamir (2002) found that 
participants in positive moods tended to exit the decision process relatively early, 
whereas those in negative mood analyzed the same information to a further extent 
before making a decision. Based on the empirical findings and theory on mood 
and cognitive processing we hypothesize that: 
 
H2a.) Participants in the negatively valenced mood conditions will engage 
more in systematic than experiential processing. 
 
H2b.) Participants in the positively valenced mood conditions will engage 
in more experiential than systematic processing. 
 
2.1.1 The moderating effect of cognitive processing on framing 
Shiomura & Atsumi (2001) investigated whether participants solving 
systematic and experiential processing tasks differed in their response to framing. 
They found that participants in the experiential processing condition showed 
classical framing effects; a preference for risk-seeking in loss frame, and a 
preference for risk-aversion in gain frame (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). In the 
systematic processing condition, however, the results suggested no framing effect. 
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These findings suggest that when people engage in systematic processing they are 
less prone to framing effects compared to individuals engaging in experiential 
processing. In the same vein, Simon, Fagley, & Halleran (2004) induced 
systematic processing by asking participants to write out the options as they 
would describe it to a friend, suggesting that systematic processing would 
moderate the effects of framing. Based on two studies including 257 participants 
they conclude that framing effects are not observed when participant engage in 
systematic processing (Simon, Fagley, & Halleran 2004).  
McElroy & Seta (2003) conducted two experiments testing both induced 
and predisposed systematic versus experiential processing on framing effects. 
Processing style was manipulated by making the designed task more or less 
relevant, as suggested by Liberman & Chaiken (1996); that highly relevant tasks 
induce more systematic processing. Consistent with their predictions and other 
findings, participants in the experiential processing condition showed classical 
framing effects, whereas participants engaging in systematic processing were 
relatively insensitive to framing effects (McElroy & Seta, 2003). Based on dual 
processing theory and findings related to framing, we hypothesize that: 
H3.) Participants engaging in systematic processing will be relatively 
insensitive to framing, compared to participants engaging in experiential 
processing. 
 
2.1.2 Arousal and Affect 
 A substantial amount of research suggests that arousal and affect play a 
central part in decision-making under risk (e.g., Bechara & Damasio, 2005; 
Damasio, 1994; Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000; Loewenstein, 
Hsee, Weber, & Welch, 2001). An intriguing finding is that increased levels of 
arousal inhibit frontal cortex functioning (brain center of reasoning and 
deliberative thought) and increase amygdala activity (emotional brain center) 
(Arnsten, 2009). This finding goes hand in hand with Ku, Malhotra, and 
Murnighan’s (2005) competitive arousal model of decision-making as they argue 
that through escalation of commitment and increased arousal, auctioneers make 
irrational economic decisions.  
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3.0.1 Method and operationalization 
In our experiment we choose to only use gain frame when studying 
framing effects, this for the simple reason that the variance in individuals’ 
preferences in gain frame seems to be greater than the more consistent findings in 
loss frame. Around 80 % to 91.1 % of the participants are found to be risk-seeking 
in loss frame (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; Hærem et al., 2010). Thus, we find it 
more constructive to apply two differently formulated versions of the Asian 
disease problem in gain frame.  
 The experiment will be conducted using a 2 (positive vs. negative mood) 
by 2 (Asian disease original vs. Asian disease terror version) design. A random 
sample of around 120 Master of Science students will be used as participants, 
randomly assigning approximately 30 participants to each condition. 
The experiment will be designed by using a program referred to as E-
prime. Two of the conditions will receive the original Asian Disease Problem as 
formulated by Tversky and Kahneman (1981). Positive and negative mood will be 
induced by using the International Affective Picture System (IAPS), which is 
validated to induce various affective states including specific emotions or moods 
(Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008). The two other conditions will receive a terror 
version of the Asian Disease Problem (which will be provided by our supervisor), 
and the same mood manipulation. 
We will control for participants’ time used on both problems, as an 
additional indicator of what cognitive processing where used during the decision-
making process. Immediately after giving their response to the problem, 
participants are asked to fill out a questionnaire measuring cognitive style 
(Appendix 1 & 2). The cognitive style questionnaire consists of 40 items in total 
ranging on a likert-scale from from 1 = I disagree to 5 = I agree. 
As a manipulation check we will attach SRS (skin response sensor) on a 
random sample of participants in each condition. As moods are hypothesized to 
increase arousal; an increase in sweat response during mood inducement will 
indicate whether the mood manipulation served its function. 
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